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SINKS AND THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME:
THE STATE OF PLAY
ALEXANDER GILLESPIE*
I.  INTRODUCTION
The sequestration of carbon by ecosystems, particularly terres-
trial environments, has been the subject of much discussion since
1990, when the method was first recognized as a way to combat cli-
mate change.  Since that point, ferocious debate has surrounded the
evolving proposals, eventually leading to the collapse of one of the
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC), and the United States walking out on the
Kyoto regime.  This article intends to show why this collapse oc-
curred, discuss the bewildering array of concerns over carbon sinks,
and reflect on the current state of play with regard to the sink ques-
tion in the overall climate regime.
II.  THE POSSIBILITIES OF SINKS
It is possible to sequester (suck up) carbon from the atmosphere
and store it in “reservoirs.”  A “reservoir” is a component of a climate
system where a greenhouse gas or a precursor of a greenhouse gas
may be stored.1  The term “sink” is used to describe the process, ac-
tivity or mechanism that removes a greenhouse gas, aerosol, or pre-
cursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere.2  Theoretically, sinks
may either be oceanic or terrestrial in nature.  The following sections
describe these processes and explain their importance to the global
climate change debate.
* L.L.B., L.L.M. (Hons) Auckland.  Ph.D. (Nottingham).  Senior Lecturer in Law, Uni-
versity of Waikato, New Zealand.
1. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 1, def. 7,
31 I.L.M. 849, 853 available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter
U.N. FCCC]
2. U.N. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 1, def. 8.
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A. Sequestration in the Ocean
It is hypothesized that huge growths of plankton formed in the
oceans 55 million years ago shortly after massive volcanic eruptions
flooded the atmosphere with carbon dioxide.  Arguably, this plankton
played a key role in removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere
and helping the Earth return to a more hospitable temperature.
Moreover, contemporary studies suggest that the phytoplankton may
currently be incorporating 45-50 billion metric tons of inorganic car-
bon into their cells every year.3  This possibility has caused a number
of scientists to suggest that plankton populations should be in-
creased.4  It has been shown that adding iron to the ocean can make
plankton bloom temporarily.5 This bloom may accelerate the reduc-
tion of carbon dioxide buildup in the atmosphere; the microscopic or-
ganisms suck up dissolved carbon dioxide from the water, which in
turn is replaced by carbon dioxide from the air.6 As plankton die and
settle on the ocean floor, their cells decompose and carbon is locked
up in the seabed, and is thereby removed from circulation.7 This cycle
causes the ocean to act as a carbon sink.  In theory, adding one ton of
iron to the ocean could lead to a bloom of plankton that could absorb
up to 10,000 tons of carbon from the atmosphere.8 Such possibilities
also suggest that “seeding the ocean” could be a relatively cheap op-
tion for reducing carbon dioxide buildup as compared to other reduc-
tion strategies.9
Despite these possibilities, the limitations of this approach have
become apparent.  There was originally “considerable quantitative
uncertainty” in this area, and it has now been shown that massive
amounts of seeding would be required to make relatively small reduc-
tions in carbon dioxide build-up.10 Further, dumping extra iron into
3. Paul G. Falkowski, The Ocean’s Invisible Forest, 287 SCI. AM. 54 (2002) (providing fig-
ures that were mathematical estimates based on satellite images of chlorophyll); Fred Pearce,
Cooling Off, NEW SCI., Sept. 16, 2000, at 10.
4. See Nolan Fell, Can Algae Cool The Planet?, NEW SCI., Aug. 21, 1993, at 34, 34-37 (dis-
cussing the effect of algae on cloud formation and the resulting effect on climate).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. William Brown, Flipping Oceans Could Turn Up The Heat, NEW SCI., Aug. 25, 1990, at
21.
9. It is estimated that this process would cost between $5 to 15 per ton of carbon dioxide
captures.  Pearce, supra note 3, at 18.
10. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [hereinafter IPCC], CLIMATE
CHANGE 1994: RADIATIVE FORCING OF CLIMATE CHANGE 17 (1995).
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the oceans may also disrupt ecological cycles.11 In fact, seeding the
oceans may actually encourage bacteria that produce methane and ni-
trous oxide.12 It may also disrupt the nutrient patterns near the surface
of the ocean and detrimentally affect biological activity in areas such
as with fisheries.13 Finally, rather than causing an explosion of algae
that would sequester carbon in the long term, seeding may simply
give planktonic animals that feed on algae a massive free lunch in the
short term.14  Due to such limitations, sequestration in the ocean has
received little attention within the formal climate change regimes.
Moreover, the Kyoto Protocol has limited emissions by sources and
removals by sinks to land-use change and forestry activities, specifi-
cally “afforestation, reforestation and deforestation.”15 By ignoring
the ocean’s impact on carbon sequestering, the Kyoto Protocol has
failed to apply full carbon accounting.16
B. Sequestration On Land
The terrestrial uptake of carbon dioxide is vast.  By the early
1980s, it became apparent that this uptake could be enhanced and
possibly used to combat global warming.  This argument first ap-
peared in 1983 when the United States Environmental Protection
Agency suggested that one way to significantly reduce the build-up of
carbon dioxide was to plant trees,17 which could absorb an average of
11. “[Researchers] from Princeton . . . developed a complex computer model to analyse
how [various] factors . . . would affect the process if 160,000 square kilometers of ocean were
seeded with iron for a month.  They found that 100 years later only between 2 and 11 percent of
the extra carbon that was originally taken up by plankton had actually been removed from the
atmosphere.”  Nicola Jones, Don’t Rely on Plankton To Save the Planet, NEW SCI., Feb. 16,
2002, at 16.
12. Nicola Jones, A Risk Too Far, NEW SCI., Oct. 20, 2001, at 7.  Methane and nitrous ox-
ide are gasses that contribute to the greenhouse effect.  Id.
13. Bubble Trouble, NEW SCI., Aug, 31, 2002, at 6 (discussing the postulation of some re-
searchers that dumping CO2 deep into the ocean will reduce the build up of gas in the atmos-
phere); John Gribbin, How Plankton Change the Climate: A Technological Fix That Does Not
Work, NEW SCI., Mar. 16, 1991, at 48, 51.
14. In field experiments, scientists discovered that “iron addition does lead to a population
explosion of algae, but the extra algae were rapidly gobbled up by planktonic animals.  Fur-
thermore . . . [m]ost of the iron settled out of the surface waters within three days, so it gave no
long-term benefit to the algae.”  Bob Holmes, No ‘Quick Fix’ For Climate, NEW SCI., Feb. 26,
1994, at 13.
15. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Conference of the Parties, 3d Sess., Dec. 10, 1997, art. 3(3), U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, 37
I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol] (stating that the Kyoto Protocol focuses attention only on
land areas subject to ‘direct human-induced’ activities since 1990).
16. IPCC, LAND USE, LAND USE CHANGE, AND FORESTRY 5 (2000).
17. Id.
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750 tons of carbon annually for each square kilometer planted.18 Thus,
to offset 50 years of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels at the
then current rate of 5 million gigatons per year, approximately 6.7
million square kilometers of sycamores would have to be planted and
maintained—an area roughly equal in size to Europe.19 Calculations
reporting similar figures appeared during the 1980s and 1990s.20
In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
suggested that a global reforestation program of 350 million hec-
tares—an area slightly larger than the European Union (EU)—could
sequester up to 35 billion tons of carbon in 50 years (about 6 percent
of all emissions between 1998 and 2050).21 Later IPCC estimates sug-
gested that improved management within a land-use and land-use
change activities had the greatest potential for net carbon change in
carbon stocks by 2010.22 The IPCC estimated the following changes in
carbon stocks achievable through improved management in the top
three areas of land use: 240 Gigatons of Carbon (Gt C) for grazing
land management, 170 Gt C for forest management, and 125 Gt C for
cropland management.  In terms of land-use change, agro-forestry
could introduce a net change of 390 Gt C.  It is important to note that
the vast majority of these savings will come from inclusion of devel-
oping countries.23
The attraction of terrestrial sequestration by forests is enhanced
by the financial savings this option presents—especially when pursued
in developing countries.  The land required for forest planting is typi-
18. Id.
19.  Lee Torrey, Raised Temperatures Over Greenhouse Effect, NEW SCI., Oct. 27, 1983, at
247 (describing that by the 1990’s, the Earth’s atmosphere would warm up as carbon dioxide
levels rise and offering the option for Greenhouse effect minimization involving sycamore trees,
which grow well in temperate climates).
20. Roger Sedjo, Forests: A Tool To Moderate Global Warming?,  ENV’T, Jan.-Feb. 1989,
at 14, 16 (1989) (discussing that 465 hectares of new plantations would be needed to sequester
the estimated annual increment of 2.9 million tons of free carbon).  Fred Pearce, Planting Trees
for a Cooler World, NEW SCI., Oct. 15, 1988, at 21 (citing a U.S. Dep’t of Energy report esti-
mating that “new forests covering 7 million square kilometers could absorb all the releases of
carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels”). Richard A. Houghton & George M. Wood-
well, Global Climate Change, SCI. AM., Apr. 1989, at 36, 44 (arguing the reforestation of one to
two million km2 will result in annual storage of one billion tons of carbon).  See generally Ed-
ward P. Glenn, et al., Growing Halophytes to Remove Carbon From the Atmosphere, ENV’T.,
Apr. 1992, at 40.
21. Fred Pearce, Growing Pains, NEW SCI., Oct. 24, 1998, at 20.
22. Id.
23. IPCC, supra note 16, at 14 (displaying in a table IPCC estimates of the potential in 2010
for net change in carbon stocks through changed land-use activities in developing countries and
globally).
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cally much cheaper in developing countries, and the forest crops tend
to grow much quicker in the tropics.24  To date, cost estimates re-
ported for forestry mitigation options vary significantly ranging from
US$0.1 per metric ton of Carbon (t/C) to about US$20/tC in non-
tropical countries.25 Thus, according to the IPCC: “Forestry options,
in some circumstances, offer large potential, modest costs, low risks,
and other benefits.”26
Once developed countries realized the clear benefits in this area
that were linked to developing countries, a number of joint bilateral
projects were undertaken.  The first sequestration project between
countries was in 1988, when an American power plant agreed to sow
52 million trees in Guatemala on farmland and other areas already
deforested.27 The theory was that the trees would absorb the amount
of carbon dioxide that would be generated by a new power station the
plant was building in the United States.28 Later deals with American
utilities were also brokered in Costa Rica; by 1998, Costa Rica had al-
ready sold credits for more than 200,000 tons of carbon dioxide.29 In
1990, the Netherlands began considering a similar plan to offset emis-
sions from its power stations by replanting previously harvested rain-
forests in South America.30 In 1994, the U.S. and Russia began a joint
carbon sequestration project.31 In 1997, Japan expressed an interest in
planting forests in other countries to offset its own emissions.32 Soon
after, one of Japan’s largest power companies made a deal in Austra-
24. Sedjo, supra note 20, at 17 (estimating a cost of $400 per hectare in Indonesia compared
to an average of $800 per hectare in the United States).  Fred Pearce, The High Cost of Carbon
Dioxide, NEW SCI., July 17, 1993, at 26.
25. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: MITIGATION 8 (2001) (stating cost estimates of biologi-
cal mitigation in subtropical and non-tropical countries and describing the limitations of the
method of financial analysis). See also IPCC, LAND USE, supra note 16, at 15.
26. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 1995: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS 11 (1996).
27. Pearce, supra note 20, at 21.
28. Id.
29. Pearce, supra note 21, at 20.
30. Peter Spinks, Replanted Rainforest Could Offset Dutch Coal-Fired Power Stations, NEW
SCI., Apr 21, 1990, at 6.
31. 5 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 205 (1994) (Russia and the US co-directed a carbon-offset for-
estry project.  The directors maintain that many companies should find carbon/forestation proj-
ects economically attractive).
32. Peter Hadfield, Japan Fiddles While the World Warms, NEW SCI., May 31, 1997, at 10
(stating “The goal will be to plant 5 million hectares of forest around the world by 2020, to ab-
sorb some of the CO2 that Japan produces every year” and noting also that the plan would not
have much of a global effect as 5 million hectares of forest are destroyed worldwide every four
months).
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lia to plant 40,500 hectares of trees.33 Finally, in 1999, Norwegian for-
estry companies were considering planting fast growing pine and
eucalyptus trees on some grassy plains in Tanzania.34
III.  SINKS WITHIN THE FCCC AND KYOTO PROTOCOL
Originally, as the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) process got underway, it was uncertain
how the convention would deal with forestry issues, both with regard
to tropical deforestation and its role in climate change.  Initial possi-
bilities included placing all forestry considerations relating to climate
change within a separate convention35 or within a specific protocol to
the forthcoming climate treaty.36 In addition, it was originally believed
that carbon sequestration was only a ‘stop-gap’/short-term measure to
slow the carbon build-up while more comprehensive responses were
worked out.37 In the end, none of these ideas eventuated, and sinks
became entrenched within the broader FCCC ambit.  This provision
followed G7 suggestions that the Convention should “consider all
sources and sinks.”38 The next year the G7 reiterated the importance
of sinks by again looking at “all sources and sinks for greenhouse
gases” as possible solutions to carbon.39 The inclusion of sinks in the
FCCC was also supported by the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD)40 and a number of multinational
corporations41 and was actively pursued by a number of key countries.
33. Tree Trade, NEW SCI., June 17, 2000, at 19 (Australian foresters planted trees under an
agreement with a Japanese power company that hopes the agreement will allow the company to
burn fossil fuels and win “carbon credits” under the Kyoto Protocol); C. Zinn, Japan Makes
Ecology Deal With Australia, GUARDIAN WKLY., Feb 24, 2000, at 2.
34. Fred Pearce, That Sinking Feeling, NEW SCI., Oct. 23, 1990, at 20, 20-21.
35. 1 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 103 (1990) (At the Houston Economic Summit, the reference to
convention or agreement left open the possibility of a free standing convention or a protocol to
the climate change convention).
36. Britain Seeks Global Action to Halt Global Warming, NEW SCI., May 20, 1989, at 22
(wherein the U.S. hosted a conference on global warming to provide a strong impetus for an
international convention on limiting the emissions of gases that contribute to the greenhouse
effect).
37. Houghton & Woodwell, supra note 20, at 44 (arguing that reforestation will help to
stabilize the composition of the atmosphere).  See generally Sedjo, supra note 20.
38. G7 Summit: Houston, July 9-11, 1990: Environment, available at http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1990houston/communique/environment.html (July 11, 1990).
39. G7 Summit: London, July 15-17, 1991: Environment available at http://www.library.
utoronto.ca/g7/summit/1991london/communique/environment.html (July 17, 1991)
40. 2 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 114 (1991) (The OECD acknowledged the world’s important
responsibilities in promoting sustainable development in limiting greenhouse gas emissions.)
41. Fred Pearce, Draft Treaty Fails to Put Limits on Emissions, NEW SCI. May 16, 1992, at
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The United States in particular wanted a broad convention that did
not just cover carbon dioxide emissions, but also sinks that absorb
greenhouse gases.42 This view was initially objected to by other states
arguing for a Convention that focused only on emissions, not sinks.43
These states raised fears about inadequate baseline data and the spec-
ter of “replacing forests with tree farms.”44
Despite such opposition, the FCCC included sinks within its am-
bit.  Accordingly, the FCCC adopted a “comprehensive” policy re-
quiring that any precautionary measure address “all relevant sources,
sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and adaptation . . . .”45  As
such, the FCCC was “aware of the role and importance in terrestrial
and marine ecosystems of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases.”46
With this background, the FCCC requires all signatories to: “Promote
sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conser-
vation and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including
biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and
marine ecosystems.”47
With specific regard to developed countries, they are obliged to
commit themselves to “mitigation of climate change, by limiting their
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and en-
hancing their greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs.”48 These FCCC
obligations were supported by Agenda 21, which called upon to coun-
tries to “promote terrestrial and marine resource utilization and ap-
propriate land-use practices that contribute to . . . the conservation,
sustainable management and enhancement, where appropriate, of all
sinks for greenhouse gases.”49
5.
42. Debora MacKenzie, Storms Cloud Gather Over Climate Talks, NEW SCI., Sept. 21,
1991, at 5 (stating “[T]he US want[ed] to ask countries to adopt measure aimed at reducing their
output of greenhouse gases and increasing the size of ‘sinks’ that absorb the gases; then seeing
what happens”).
43. Debora MacKenzie, America Creates Cold Climate For Greenhouse Talks, NEW SCI.,
June 22, 1991, at 16 (noting the talks looked to end in deadlock as the US continued to reject
the notion of targets for the reduction of greenhouse emissions).
44. 2 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 113 (1991).
45. U.N. FCCC, supra note 1, art. 3, para. 3 (discussing principles that should guide na-
tional policy in the area of climate change).
46. Id. pre., para. 4.
47. Id. art. 4, para. 1(d).
48. Id. art. 4, para. 2(a).
49. Agenda 21, 9.20.a.ii, available at gopher://gopher.un.org/00/conf/unced/ English/a21_09.txt.
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Despite this wording, the question of how far sinks could be
utilized within the FCCC context remained.  Developing flexibility
mechanisms50 and overall scientific uncertainties with regard to terres-
trial sinks increased uncertainty.51 Nevertheless, it was agreed that the
forthcoming Protocol should cover all greenhouse gases, their emis-
sions by sources, and removals by sinks.52 Indeed, the Berlin Mandate,
which set objectives for the Kyoto Protocol including specific reduc-
tion targets stated that the targets should cover “anthropocentric
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not
controlled by the Montreal Protocol.”53 The Kyoto Protocol further
entrenched the role of sinks in the United Nations’ framework for re-
sponding to climatic change.  Accordingly, parties obliged to make
reductions in their greenhouse emissions faced certain requirements:
The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and re-
movals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use
change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation
and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in
carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the
commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I.
The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks as-
sociated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and
verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and
8.54
In addition, these parties were to elaborate on their policies, and in-
clude the:  [p]rotection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into
account commitments under relevant international environmental
agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices,
afforestation and reforestation.55 An exception was added for coun-
tries whose land use change and forestry practices lead to disadvanta-
50. 4 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 143 (1993); Fred Pearce, All Gas and Guesswork, NEW SCI.,
July 30, 1994, at 14.
51. 8 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 177 (1997).
52. See also 6 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 229 (1995); Report of the Ad Hoc Group On the Berlin
Mandate On the Work of Its Second Session, United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change, Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate, 2nd Sess., Para. 51, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AAGBM/1995/7/ (1995).
53. Report of the Conference of the Parties On Its First Session, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., pt. 2, Decision 1/CP.1, at 4,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1 (1995).
54. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3(3) (referring to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol,
which delineates the quantified green house gas emissions limitation ascribed to each Annex I
country).
55. Id. art. 2 (a) (ii).
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geous high point for emissions in 1990.  Thus:
Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and
forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in
1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the
aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by
sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for
the purposes of calculating their assigned amount.56
Each party was required to provide data establishing its level of
carbon stocks in 1990 to enable an estimate to be made of future
changes in its carbon stocks.57 With regard to questions of scientific
uncertainty in this area, it was stipulated that the parties were obliged
to “research on, and promot[e], . . . carbon dioxide sequestration
technologies.”58
Finally, it was acknowledged that much remained to be done.
Accordingly, it was agreed that in the future,
[m]odalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional
human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas
emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural
soils and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added
to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in
Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in report-
ing, verifiability, [and] the methodological work of [the various sci-
entific bodies].59
IV.  SINKS FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE 6TH COP
Although the Kyoto Protocol gave a clear nod to the utilization
of sinks, it was apparent that much work remained to be done in this
area, and difficult, substantive decisions on the necessary modalities
were deferred.60 These decisions were not really settled until the 7th
COP in 2001 following the most volatile period in the life of the cli-
mate change regime.
The conflict began with a slow build up.  Indeed, although states
broadly agreed to deal with sinks during the first commitment period
at the 4th COP in 1998,61 the issue was largely postponed until the
56. Id. art. 3 (7).
57. Id. art. 3(4).
58. Id. art. 2(1)(a)(iv).
59. Id. art. 3(4).
60. 8 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 178 (1997); Fred Pearce, It’s a Deal, But Can it Work?, NEW
SCI., Dec. 13, 1997, at 6.
61. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fourth Session, United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 4th Sess., pt. 2, Decision
9/CP.4, at 40, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1/CP.4 (1999) [hereinafter Conference of the
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IPCC special report on land use, land-use change, and forestry
(LULUCF) was ready.62 This holding pattern was repeated at the 5th
COP.63 Finally, when the issue was confronted at the 6th COP at the
Hague in 2000, the COP collapsed (with the United States walking
out) and had to be resumed months later.  The conflict was largely
caused by disagreement over the role that sinks were to play in the
Protocol.64 Those who wanted a very liberal regime that would
broadly include sinks in carbon accounting (primarily the United
States, Australia, Russia, Japan and Canada) could not come to terms
with those who wanted a very conservative regime that would strictly
curtail the use of sinks.65  The following sections describe the meeting
held subsequent to this collapse and the climate change regime deal-
ing with LULUCF that resulted.
A. Commitment Periods
At the 7th COP in 2001, it was agreed that the IPCC’s methodo-
logical accounting of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (those
Parties 4] (stating that sinks will be included in calculations of net changes in carbon stocks re-
sulting from direct human-induced activities of reforestation and deforestation during the first
commitment period).  Climate Change: Plan of Action Adopted, 29 ENVTL POL’Y & L. 3 (1999),
available at http://search.epnet.com/direct.asp?an=1985468&db=afh (describing the proceedings
of the Fourth Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
held from November 2-13, 1998).
62. Conference of the Parties 4, supra note 61, Decision 9/CP.4, ¶ 3, 4, & 5, at 40-41
(agreeing to recommend to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol a draft decision for adoption on
“modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities re-
lated to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricul-
tural soils” but stating that the draft decision will not be presented until the completion of the
IPCC LULUCF report).
63. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifth Session, United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 5th Sess., pt. 2, Decision 16/CP.5, at
40, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1999/6/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter Conference of the Parties 5] (further
postponing introduction of the draft decision to enable incorporation of the still forthcoming
IPCC report on LULUCF).
64. Fred Pearce, NEW SCI., July 28, 2001, at 13 (explaining that the issue was how much a
country could offset carbon dioxide emissions with “carbon sinks” of forests and farm soils).
65. David M. Reiner, Climate Impasse: How The Hague Negotiations Failed, ENV’T, Mar.
2001, at 36 (“The US delegate arrived claiming they had an ‘understanding’ from the Kyoto Pro-
tocol talks three years ago that they could have carbon credits for doing little more than watch-
ing trees grow . . . [the European] successors in The Hague were not interested”); Time To
Come Clean, NEW SCI., Dec. 2, 2000, at 3; Pearce, supra note 64, at 13; Disappointment At Mea-
gre Progress, 30 ENVTL POL’Y & L. 264 (2000), available at http://search.epnet.com/ di-
rect.asp?an=3988149&db=afh; Michael McCarthy, Kyoto Talks Stall In Dispute Over Carbon
Sinks, INDEP. (London), July 20, 2001, at 15 (arguing the potential use of trees as carbon sinks
was emerging as the principal obstacle to the Kyoto Protocol); Sarah Simpson, Debit or Credit?,
SCI. AM., Feb. 2001, at 25.
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resulting directly from human-induced degradation and de-vegetation
activities) should be included only in the first commitment period.66
This result frustrated the progress of other states that advocated ap-
plying the IPCC’s work to future commitment periods so that they
could act with certainty in this area.67 Thus, the second commitment
period is open to review and contemporary accounting for LULUCF
does not imply a transfer of agreement to any future commitment pe-
riod.68 Nevertheless, to assure consistency, once land is accounted for
as required under Article 3, paragraphs 3 and 4, all anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks occurring
on that terrestrial area must be accounted for in subsequent and con-
tiguous commitment periods.69
B. Overall Claim Potential
Prior to the collapse of the first part of COP 6, the United States
calculated that sinks could provide as much as half of its annual re-
duction obligations by 2010 (312 million out of the necessary 600 mil-
lion ton reduction).70 Therefore, the United States was strongly op-
posed to any restriction on claims of potential carbon sinks.71
However, due to scientific uncertainty in calculation of carbon se-
questration by sinks, the EU rejected the U.S. position and demanded
limits on how much forest sequestration could be claimed toward
meeting Kyoto obligations.72 Although the two factions neared
agreement in this area (with the U.S. offering to reduce its sink claim
from 312 to 20 million tons), an accord proved too elusive and the
talks collapsed.73
When the COP reconvened without the United States it was
agreed that for the first commitment period a Party, included in An-
66. Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Seventh Session, United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, pt. 2, Annex, Decision
11/CP.7, at 59, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1. 21 (2002) [hereinafter Conference of the
Parties 7].  Definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines relating to land use, land-use change and
forestry activities under the Kyoto Protocol.
67. IPCC, supra note 16, at 4 (providing an overview of the global magnitude of carbon
stocks in terrestrial systems).
68. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Decision 11/CP.7 ¶ 1 at 54.
69. Id. Annex Decision 11/CP.7 at 61-62.
70. Id.
71. Disappointment At Meagre Progress, 30 ENVTL POL’Y & L. 217 (2000).
72.  Hotting Up In The Hague, ECONOMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 97 (describing the gathering
of 5,000 at the Hague to discuss implementing the United Nations Kyoto treaty on climate
change drawn up in 1997).
73. Simpson, supra note 65, at 25; 11 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 170 (2000).
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nex I that incurred a net source of emissions under the provisions of
Article 3, paragraph 3, may account for anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in areas under forest
management under Article 3, paragraph 4, up to the greater of net
emissions under the provisions of 3.3 or 9.0 MtC times five.  This pro-
vision applied only to parties whose total anthropogenic greenhouse
gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in managed forests
since 1990 were equal to, or larger than, the net source of emissions
incurred under Article 3, paragraph 3.74 Further, for the first commit-
ment period, any additions to or subtractions from a Party’s carbon
reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol resulting from forest
management activities, could not exceed values prescribed by the
COP.75 A Party could also request reconsideration of the value pre-
scribed to it.76
C. “Since 1990”
The Kyoto Protocol is explicit that LULUCF is “limited to affor-
estation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990.”77 However,
many forests are sustainably managed; regeneration and harvesting
are continual processes.  The “since 1990” starting date set forth by
the Protocol will account for only those stands harvested or regener-
ated since 1990.  The benchmark chosen will result in either net cred-
its or net debits being falsely created.  For example, a state that de-
forested its land before 1990 at the beginning of the first commitment
period, but then reforests in the following decade would obtain wind-
fall credits toward carbon reduction without ever having taken into
account the emissions associated with the earlier deforestation.
74. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Decision 11/CP.7 art. 3, ¶ 4 at 60.
75. Id. (referring to forest management activities described in Article 3 paragraph 4 of the
Kyoto Protocol.  The maximum addition to or subtraction from the Kyoto Protocol carbon re-
duction requirements could not exceed the following values times five, [values are in Mt C/yr,
which may be found at FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.1 on page 63]).  Australia 0.00, Austria 0.63, Bel-
gium 0.03, Bulgaria 0.37, Canada 12.00, Czech Republic 0.32, Denmark 0.05, Estonia 0.10, Fin-
land 0.16, France 0.88, Germany 1.24, Greece 0.09, Hungary 0.29, Iceland 0.00, Ireland 0.05, It-
aly 0.18, Japan 13.00, Latvia 0.34, Liechtenstein 0.01, Lithuania 0.28, Luxembourg 0.01, Monaco
0.00, Netherlands 0.01, New Zealand 0.20, Norway 0.40, Poland 0.82, Portugal 0.22, Romania
1.10,Russian Federation 33.00 (changed from 17.65 by decision 12/CP.7), Slovakia 0.50, Slovenia
0.36, Spain 0.67, Sweden 0.58, Switzerland 0.50, Ukraine 1.11, United Kingdom 0.37.  Id. Ap-
pendix at 63
76. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Decision 11/CP.7 art. 3, ¶ 4 at 60.
77. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3(3) (emphasis added)(stating that net changes in
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks that may be accounted for in meet-
ing Protocol commitments must result from “direct human-induced LULUCF activities, limited
to afforestation reforestation and deforestation since 1990”).
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Likewise, if land was reforested prior to 1990, but harvested before
2008, the state’s emissions would appear to increase.  This failure to
account for a state’s initial condition when calculating its net carbon
emissions creates odd results.78
This problem was dealt with at the 7th COP.  It was agreed that
carbon removals attributable to activities and practices before the
reference year would be excluded.79 In addition, debits resulting from
harvesting during the first commitment period would not be greater
than credits accounted for on that unit of land.80
D. Scientific Uncertainty
The Kyoto Protocol was explicit that any utilization of LULUCF
would require “verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commit-
ment period” and that associated “activities shall be reported in a
transparent and verifiable manner,” reviewable in accordance with
Articles 7 and 8 of the Protocol.81 Toward these goals, the Protocol
stipulated that scientific bodies should develop and future COPs
adopt “modalities, rules and guidelines taking into account uncertain-
ties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, “and the work of various
advisory scientific bodies.”82
Despite strong scientific carbon accounting in this area, estima-
tions of emissions and sequestration by terrestrial sinks have proven
very problematic.  As the IPCC noted in 1995 and reiterated in 200183
there is “considerable quantitative uncertainty” in this area.84  Theo-
retically, a well-designed carbon accounting system would provide
transparent, consistent, comparable, complete, accurate, verifiable,
78. IPCC, supra note 16, at 6-7 (describing the shortcomings of the limited inclusion of
LULUCF activities in Article 3(3),(4) of the Kyoto Protocol).
79. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Decision 11/CP.7 at 54.
80. Id. Annex Decision 11/CP.7 art. 3, ¶ 4 at 59-60.
81. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3(3).
82. Id. art. 4(4).
83. The degree to which terrestrial ecosystems continue to be net sinks for carbon is uncer-
tain due to the complex interactions between the factors mentioned above (e.g., arctic terrestrial
ecosystems and wetlands may act as both sources and sinks) (medium confidence).  IPCC, supra
note 25, at 11 (stating past research indicated terrestrial ecosystems appeared be to be storing
increasing amounts of carbon, but that the degree to which terrestrial ecosystems continue to be
net sinks for carbon is uncertain because while carbon uptake by terrestrial ecosystems was
thought to be due to heightened plant productivity due to elevated CO2 concentration, increas-
ing temperatures, and soil moisture changes, it now appears that productivity gains are smaller
than what past research indicated and that terrestrial uptake may be due more to change in uses
and management of land than to the direct effects of elevated CO2 and climate).
84. IPCC, supra note 10, at 17.
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and efficient recording and reporting of changes in carbon stocks
and/or changes in greenhouse emissions from LULUCF.  In fact,
many of these goals can be achieved.  Changes in carbon stocks and
greenhouse emissions over time can be estimated using some combi-
nation of direct measurements, activity data, and models that are
based on accepted principles of statistical analyses, forest inventories,
remote sensing techniques, flux measurements, soil sampling and
ecological surveys.  However, these measures may vary in accuracy,
precision, verifiability, cost and scale of application.  Inconsistencies
also arise due to the discontinuity in states’ decisions concerning
which carbon pools and sinks to count and their varied ability to dis-
tinguish between human-induced and natural changes in carbon flux.85
The problems in this area arise from three sources.  First, during
the 1990s, there were no agreed criteria for accurate measurements.
For example, with the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects
from the 1990s, there was no standard method for determining base-
lines or agreement over the level of precision that would be required
when measuring and monitored.86 Second, the capacities and abilities
of even developed countries to fully measure all of their carbon
stocks are limited.  As of 2000, although most developed countries
had the basic technical capacity to measure carbon stocks and net
greenhouse emissions in terrestrial ecosystems, few if any performed
all of these measurements routinely, particularly soil inventories.87 In-
deed, some developed countries may need to “significantly improve”
their existing measurement systems in order to develop operational
systems in this area.88 Finally, distinguishing natural from anthropo-
genically caused changes in LULUCF can be very difficult.  For ex-
ample, much of the carbon stored in trees, related biomass and soils
moves between the air and the ground both seasonally and as the re-
sult of anthropogenic sources such as forest fires or small changes in
land use.89 Difficulty in distinguishing between the two causes has im-
plications for carbon accounting.90 The scientific uncertainty in this
85. IPCC, supra note 16, at 7-9 (proposing two accounting systems that will solve several
current problems in recording and reporting changes in carbon stocks to meet stated FCCC
goals of transparency, consistency, comparability, completeness, accuracy, verifiability, and effi-
ciency in reporting).  See also, Fred Pearce, Dead and Buried, NEW SCI., May 12, 2001, at 19;
Sedjo, supra note 20, at 19.
86. IPCC, supra note 16, at 16 (discussing generally Project-Based Activities).
87. Id.
88. IPCC, supra note 16, at 11.
89. Pearce, supra note 50, at 14-15.
90. Fred Pearce, Smokescreen Exposed, NEW SCI., Aug, 26, 2000, at 18, 18-19 (noting that,
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area is so pronounced that in some cases it may be such, that in cer-
tain instances it may be “impossible, to distinguish with present scien-
tific tools that proportion of the observed stock change that is directly
human induced from that proportion that is caused by indirect and
natural factors.”91
In 1998, a report suggested that the United States’ forests were
sucking up 1.5 billion tons of carbon per year, just short of the coun-
try’s annual carbon emissions.92  However, critics of this study high-
lighted the many uncertainties in the sequestration assumptions (such
as assumptions that all forests are operating at maximum capacity and
failures to take into account the impacts of fires, pests, etc.).93 These
criticisms were borne out in a new study in 1999 that employed a dif-
ferent methodology and suggested that the forests were only seques-
tering about one-fifth of total U.S. emissions.94 Similarly, in the EU as
of the end of the 20th century, it was believed that carbon sequestra-
tion by forests absorbed between 120 and 280 million tons of carbon
per year.  This large range belies an uncertainty level in excess of 50
percent.95
Another source of uncertainty is the potential for forests to actu-
ally produce carbon emissions.  The use and promotion of forest se-
questration could indirectly produce negative effects on climate
change.96 In addition to these indirect effects, there may also be direct
while forests may be “carbon sinks” today, they may “leak” carbon in the future); Pearce, supra
note 21, at 20 (explaining that “it is inherently difficult to estimate how much CO2 is produced
or absorbed by biological activity” because of additional variables such as acid rain, different
growth rates among trees, and climate); Pearce, supra note 50, at 14-15 (citing a variety of vari-
ables that make categorization of greenhouse gas emissions as natural or anthropogenic very
difficult).
91. IPCC, supra note 16, at 10.
92. Gabrielle Walker, A Perfect Excuse, NEW SCI., Oct. 24, 1998, at 5.
93. Walker, supra note 92, at 5; Fuel’s Paradise, NEW SCI., Oct. 24, 1998, at 3 (arguing the
results of the study were “riddled with uncertainties”, including reliance on “models whose as-
sumptions are largely untested.”  The study also had a large margin of error). For the problems
of fires and pests generally in this area see IPCC, supra note 16, at 7.
94. Robert Adler, That Sinking Feeling, NEW SCI., July 31, 1999, at 3 (using the “top-down”
approach).
95. Fred Pearce, The Heat is On, NEW SCI., July 14, 2001, at 18; Pearce, supra note 21, at
20; Fred Pearce, Soaking it Up, NEW SCI., Oct. 3, 1998, at 20.
96. For example, in the UK peat bogs hold the equivalent of more than 100 years of UK
carbon emissions.  These bogs may be vulnerable to leakage, caused by such activities as plant-
ing forests on them.  Forestry practices in peat bogs may then turn these former carbon sinks
into carbon sources. Fred Pearce, Peat Bogs Hold Bulk of Britain’s Carbon, NEW SCI., Nov. 19,
1994, at 6.  Another possible negative effect is that in the far north, although they may sequester
carbon, during winter they may soak up solar energy that would otherwise have been reflected
by the snow-covered tundra.  Reflect on It, NEW SCI., May 13, 2000, at 19 (discussing how the
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limitations on the long-term ability of forests to effectively sequester
carbon.  It may be that there is a threshold temperature, at which lev-
els of carbon sequestration begin to decline or forests reach their
saturation point.97 In addition, a warmer climate would speed up the
microbial breakdown of leaf litter, releasing even more carbon diox-
ide into the atmosphere.  In some instances, the breakdown of leaf lit-
ter and subsequent carbon emission may actually equal the carbon
uptake by the trees.98 Moreover, if warm temperatures are sustained
beyond a certain point, forests (some of which are more vulnerable
than others) may fail to adapt and would begin to die off.99 In the pro-
cess of decay, carbon that was previously sequestered would break
down and be re-released to the atmosphere.  In these ways forests
could introduce dangerous positive feedbacks to global warming.100 In
1995, the IPCC warned that models were projecting that a sustained
increase of one degree Celsius in global mean temperature would be
sufficient to cause changes in regional climates, thereby affecting the
growth and regenerative capacity of forests in these regions.  This re-
sult could significantly alter the composition of forests.  For example,
under a doubling of carbon dioxide, the resultant changes in tempera-
ture and water availability would cause a substantial fraction of ex-
isting forests to undergo major changes.101  However, when consider-
Kyoto Protocol calls for reforestation to slow warming, but planting trees in the far north may
actually increase global warming).
97. IPCC, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing that absorption by existing sources is sensitive to
climate change as well as to atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations.  Rising temperatures
may result in something called a “feedback loop” thus turning terrestrial ecosystems, which cur-
rently operate as a carbon sink, into a net carbon source).  See generally Peter M. Cox, et al.,
Acceleration of Global Warming Due to Carbon-Cycle Feedbacks in a Coupled Climate Model,
408 NATURE 184 (2000).
98. James Randerson, No Easy Answer, NEW SCI., Apr. 13, 2002, at 16 (estimating that an
atmospheric warming of 5ºC would invigorate soil microbes that decompose fallen leaves and
negate any benefit); Simpson, supra note 65, at 25; Pearce, supra note 34, at 20-21.
99.  Trees May Fare Badly As Britain Warms, NEW SCI., Oct. 21, 1989, at 35 (indicating the
deleterious ramifications of the Greenhouse Effect on the Sitka spruce, a staple of British cli-
mate that grows in cooler, moist regions).
100. IPCC, supra note 26, at 6.  A. White, et al., Climate Change Impacts on Ecosystems and
the Terrestrial Carbon Sink, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE S21 (1999) (explaining that combined
biogeochemical, biophysical and biogeological ecosystem model predicts benefits from carbon
sinks to end by the year 2050); Fred Pearce, Only Ourselves to Blame, NEW SCI., Nov. 20, 1999,
at 24 (“The world’s forests could introduce a dangerous ‘positive feedback’ to global warming,
as forests that are currently absorbing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere could release it
again if they succumb to heat stress”).
101. IPCC, supra note 26, at 5-6 (discussing predicted changes in forest composition and
function at various latitudes).  Pearce, supra note 34, at 20-21 (noting that the thermal inertia of
the oceans has created a 50-year time lag so that the “extra outpouring of CO2” from forests is
not yet apparent).
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ing these possibilities, it is important to note that there are very large
uncertainties with regard to estimates of physiological acclimation
and climatic constraints that could result beyond a few decades into
the future.102
Subsequent to the Kyoto Protocol, COP attempts to deal with
these uncertainties by stressing the strong scientific support and con-
sistent methodologies found at the 6th103 and 7th COPs.104 Scientific
bodies were given specific tasks with the goal of producing more cer-
tainty in some of the LULUCF areas.105 The scientific bodies were
also required to develop methodologies to factor out emissions by
sources and removals by sinks due to indirect human-induced and
natural effects from those that were produced as the result of past
practices in forests (pre-reference year).106 To achieve consistency in
the accounting of carbon pools, it was agreed that each developed
country would account for all changes in the following carbon pools:
aboveground biomass, belowground biomass, litter, dead wood, and
soil organic carbon.  Parties could choose not to account for a given
pool during a commitment period if transparent and verifiable infor-
mation were provided to show that the pool was not a source of car-
bon.107
E. Forestation & Deforestation
During the initial negotiations for the FCCC, one of the fears
about including sinks was that doing so would lead to a process of
“replacing forests with tree farms.”108 This concern, which remained
prominent through the 1990s, focused on the possibility that the Pro-
102. IPCC, supra note 16, at 4 (depicting estimated global carbon stocks in vegetation and
soil carbon pools, but disclaiming that the numbers are considerably uncertain due to scientific
limitation).
103. Review of the Implementation of the Commitments and of Other Provisions of the Con-
vention—Preparations for the First Session of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meet-
ing of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Conference of the Parties, 1st Sess., pt. 2, Decision 5/CP.6, VII(1)(a) & (b), at 10, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/L.7 (2001) [hereinafter Conference of the Parties 6] .
104. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, at 54; Michael McCarthy, Climate Deal
Reached, INDEP. (London), July 24, 2001, at 6 (asserting that sinks will “only be allowed on the
basis of ‘sound science’”).
105. The IPCC were requested to develop both definitions for direct human-induced ‘deg-
radation’ of forests and ‘de-vegetation’ of other vegetation types and methodological options for
inventorying.
106. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Decision 11/CP.7 ¶ (c) at 54.
107. Id. Decision 11/CP.7 at 61.
108. 2 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 113 (1991).
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tocol actually promoted deforestation (fast growing plantations pro-
duced more credits than did standing old-growth forests), and its sub-
sequent impact on biodiversity and indigenous communities.  As
such, it became imperative to create a regime that did not encourage
deforestation of old-growth forests and their replacement with fast-
growing plantations.109 As the IPCC broadly recognized: “For activi-
ties within countries or projects between countries, if sustainable de-
velopment criteria vary significantly across countries or regions, there
may be incentives to locate activities and projects in areas with less
stringent environmental or socio-economic criteria.”110
This problem was confronted with detailed rules and a commit-
ment to act in conformity with the objectives of other multilateral en-
vironmental agreements, only utilizing LULUCF activities that con-
tribute to the conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of
natural resources.111 The steps taken were in conformity with an IPCC
recommendation.112 Further, the Kyoto Protocol obliged developed
countries, in fulfilling their obligations, to promote sustainable devel-
opment in a manner that would take “into account its commitments
under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of
sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforesta-
tion.”113
Forestation and deforestation practices were made somewhat
more consistent when a number of definitions were agreed upon
during the 6th COP and finalized at the 7th COP.  Although the de-
fining of terms may appear to be a simple issue, there are many possi-
ble definitions of “forest” and several meanings of the terms “affore-
station, reforestation and deforestation.”  The depth of this problem
can be seen by the fact that, until 2000, the term “forest” had not
been defined within the climate regime.  The use of definitions in
109. See generally Alexander Gillespie, Sinks, Biodiversity and Forests: Inter-Linkages With
Other Environmental Multilateral Agreements and Instruments, in GLOBAL CLIMATE
GOVERNANCE: INTER-LINKAGES BETWEEN THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND OTHER
MULTILATERAL REGIMES 117 (B. Chambers ed. 1998); 8 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 303 (1997); 11
Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 171 (2000); Pearce, supra note 21, at 20; Hotting Up, supra note 72, at 97.
110. IPCC, supra note 16, at 17 (noting that sequestration may create an incentive to cut
down old-growth forests and plant “fast-growing carbon-guzzling” trees in their place).
111. Report of the Conference of the Parties on First Part of Its Sixth Session, United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 6th Sess., pt. 1, Note by
President of the Conference, at 4-18, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2000/5/Add.2 (2001) [hereinafter
Conference of the Parties 6, President Note]; Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, Deci-
sion 11/CP.7 at 54.
112. IPCC, supra note 16, at 17.
113. Kyoto Protocol, supra, note 15, art. 2(1).
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these agreements is critical as it determines the amount a country’s
reduction or limitation commitment that can be counted through land
use change and forestry activities.114
Definitions of forests and other wooded lands may be produced
using legal, administrative, or cultural requirements, by employing
terms such as land use, canopy cover, or carbon density.  Most defini-
tions relate to percentages of canopy cover.115 The amount of canopy
cover has a strong impact in the context of the Kyoto Protocol.  For
example, if a high threshold was set (e.g. 70 percent canopy cover)
then many areas of sparse forest and woodland could be cleared or
planted and the resultant carbon loses or gains would not be ac-
counted in determining forest emissions/sequestration under the Pro-
tocol.  If a low threshold was set (e.g. 10 percent canopy cover) then
dense forest could be heavily degraded and significant amounts of
carbon released, without the actions being registered as “deforesta-
tion.”  Similarly, a forest with low canopy cover (15 percent, for ex-
ample), could be considerably enhanced without the actions actually
qualifying as “reforestation” or “afforestation.”116
At the 6th COP, it was agreed that for the first commitment pe-
riod the standard FAO definition of ‘forest’ would be utilized.117  The
FAO defines forests by considerations such as height and density, al-
though a certain degree of flexibility is retained in the definition when
considering national circumstances.118
For definitions of “afforestation,” “reforestation,” and “defores-
tation, the IPCC recommendations were largely followed.  Accord-
ingly, “afforestation” is the conversion of land that has not been for-
est for at least fifty years into forested land through direct human
inducements, such as planting, seeding, and/or promotion of natural
seed sources.119 “Reforestation” is also a directly human-induced con-
version of non-forested land into forested land.120 The key difference
is that, under the Kyoto Protocol and consistent with standard prac-
tice,121 “reforestation” does not entail a fifty-year-period during which
114. 11 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 170 (2000); IPCC, supra note 16, at 5 (noting the problem and
giving several examples of varying definitions of these terms developed for a variety of pur-
poses).
115. IPCC, supra note 16, at 5-6.
116. Id. at 5 (providing a hypothetical example of the impact of this problem).
117. Conference of the Parties 6, President Note, supra note 111.
118. Id.
119. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, at 59.
120. Id. at 59-60.
121. Afforestation is usually defined as the establishment of forest on land that has been
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the land was not forested.  Both lands were previously “deforested,”
since they were converted to “non-forest” lands at some point.  “De-
forestation” is the direct human-induced conversion of forested land
to non-forested land.122 For the first commitment period, “reforesta-
tion” activities will be limited to any reforestation occurring on lands
that were not forested as of December 31, 1989.123 The difference be-
tween deforestation and the reestablishment of forests following har-
vesting must be kept clear, and the distinction is subject to external
review.124
F. Additional Activities
No sooner had it become apparent that forests could sequester
carbon, than it also became apparent that a number of other human
activities could perform similar functions.  For example, changing ag-
ricultural practices such as tillage approaches can significantly reduce
the amount of carbon emitted from the soil.125 The Kyoto Protocol
expressly recognized that future COPs would consider “additional
human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emis-
sions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils” and
whether the then standing LULUCF categories should be altered.126
without forest for a period of time (e.g. 20-50 years) and was previously under a different land
use. Some definitions of reforestation have no time period, between the harvesting of estab-
lished forests, and their replanting. IPCC, supra note 16, at 6 (defining ‘afforestation’ as the es-
tablishment of forest on land that has been without forest for a period of at least 20-50 years and
defining ‘reforestation’ as the activity of regenerating trees immediately after disturbance or
harvesting where no land-use change occurs).
122. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, at 60-61.
123. “For the purposes of determining the area of deforestation to come into the accounting
system under Article 3, paragraph 3, each Party shall determine the forest area using the same
spatial assessment unit as is used for the determination of afforestation and reforestation, but
not larger than 1 hectare.” Id. at 59.
124. “Each Party included in Annex I shall report . . . on how harvesting or forest distur-
bance followed by the re-establishment of a forest is distinguished from deforestation. This in-
formation will be subject to review in accordance with Article 8.”  Id.
125. For example, carbon levels in the soil are determined by the balance of inputs, as crop
residues and organic amendments, and carbon losses through organic matter decomposition.
Thus, management to increase soil organic carbon and to enhance the potential to sequester
carbon requires increasing carbon inputs, decreasing decomposition, or both.  Soil erosion can
add to this process.  Conservation tillage covers practices that range from reducing the number
of trips over the field to raising crops without primary or secondary tillage.  Leaving crop resi-
dues on the surface after planting, are also considerations.  At all points, changing agricultural
practice can reduce carbon dioxide emissions (and often improve soil quality at the same time).
Noel D. Uri & Herby Bloodworth, Global Climate Change and the Effect of Conservation Prac-
tices in US Agriculture, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 197 (2000).
126. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 15, art. 3 (4).
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However, debate over how far to extend these categories was prob-
lematic for two reasons.127 First, it is possible to interpret “activity” ei-
ther broadly (e.g. cropland management) or narrowly (e.g. particular
tillage method, fertilization technique or cover crop).  If the term is
broadly defined it may be difficult to separate human-induced
changes from naturally occurring changes.  A narrow definition based
on specific activities such as reduced tillage or irrigation management
could lend itself to activity-based accounting that would be related to
each individual practice.128 Second, it is unclear whether the additional
activities considered should be limited to agricultural practices.  For
example, in 1999, the United States announced that they wanted to
count landfills (which can also sequester carbon) as sinks.129
A partial solution to this problem was arrived at during the split
sessions of the 6th and 7th COPs130 when it was decided that in addi-
tion to counting afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation in the
first commitment period, re-vegetation,131 forest management,132
cropland management,133 and grazing land management134 could also
be counted.  A Party shall elect what it will count in the first commit-
ment period and shall demonstrate that re-vegetation, forest man-
agement, cropland management, and grazing land management have
127. 11 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 170 (2000).
128. IPCC, supra note 16, at 4.
129. This was because by burying wastepaper and wood (of which 70 and 97 percent respec-
tively never rots in a buried landfill remains locked in the ground), could permanently lock away
their carbon which would otherwise escape into the atmosphere.  The US calculated that this
could lock up 28 million tons of carbon per year (about 2 percent of the annual US emissions
from burning fossil fuels).  Fred Pearce, A Dirty Business, NEW SCI., Jan. 23, 1999, at 22.  See
also, Observer. How UN Climate Talks Fell Apart, N.Z. HERALD, Nov 27, 2000, at B1; Brian
Fallow & Reuters, Outrage Over the Collapse of Climate Talks, N.Z. HERALD, Nov 27, 2000, at
A3; Gwynne Dyer, Britain’s Hague Concession to US Only Realistic Option, N.Z. HERALD, Nov
28, 2000, at A15.
130. President Conference of the Parties 6 Note, supra note 111.  See also Conference of the
Parties 7, supra note 66, at 59-60.
131. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, at 58. “‘Re-vegetation’ is the direct human-
induced activity to increase carbon stocks on sites through the establishment of vegetation that
covers a minimum area of 0.05 hectares but does not meet the definitions of afforestation and
reforestation contained here.”
132. “‘Forest management’ is a system of practices for stewardship and use of forest land
aimed at fulfilling relevant ecological (including biological diversity), economic and social func-
tions of the forest in a sustainable manner.”  Id.
133. “‘Cropland management’ is the system of practices on land on which agricultural crops
are grown and on land that is set aside or temporarily not being used for crop production.”  Id.
134. “‘Grazing land management’ is the system of practices on land used for livestock pro-
duction aimed at manipulating the amount and type of vegetation and livestock produced.”  Id.
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occurred since 1990, and are human-induced.135 Specific modalities for
this accounting were agreed to at the 6th COP.136 For the first com-
mitment period, anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by sources
and removals by the additional sinks (such as cropland management,
grazing land management and re-vegetation) shall be equal to an-
thropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by
sinks in the commitment period, less five times the anthropogenic
greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by the additional
sinks in the Party’s base year.137 Double-counting through any of the
additional sink activities must be avoided.138
G. LULUCF & The Flexibility Mechanisms
At the 6th COP, it was agreed (but not finalized) that the extent
of LULUCF inclusion within the CDM would be limited to afforesta-
tion and reforestation; the issues of non-permanence, social and envi-
ronmental effects, leakage, additionality, and uncertainty still require
methodological work.139 Conversely, it was decided that the preven-
tion of deforestation and land degradation would not be eligible to
generate credits under the CDM.140 Finally, for the first commitment
period, the total additions to and subtractions from the Party’s as-
signed amount (determined from eligible LULUCF activities under
Articles 12) was not to exceed one percent of the Party’s base year
135. Id. at 59-60.
136. It was agreed that with regard to the first commitment period, the contribution of addi-
tional activities under article 3.4, towards meeting a Party’s target in the first commitment pe-
riod shall be limited to three percent of the Party’s base year emissions.  Moreover, accounting
for additional activities shall take place through two distinguished intervals.  The first interval
was created due to the fact that some countries had an overall increase in their total forest car-
bon stock. However, this first interval shall not be more than 30 Mt carbon dioxide.  With re-
gard to the second interval, a discounted crediting was to apply due to non-human induced ef-
fects and remaining uncertainties in this area.  In particular, in the second period parties were to
exclude the effects of indirect nitrogen deposition, elevated carbon dioxide concentrations,
other indirect effects and, (for forest ecosystems) the dynamic effects of age structure resulting
from management activities before 1990.  Therefore, Parties shall apply a reduction of thirty
percent to the net carbon stock changes and net GHG emissions that result from additional
cropland and grazing land management activities and of eighty-five percent to the net carbon
stock changes and net GHG emissions that result from additional forest management.
137. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66, at 59-60.
138. Id.
139. Conference of the Parties 6, supra note 103, at 11-12; President Conference of the Par-
ties 6 Note, supra note 111.
140. Note, however, it was believed that these activities were could qualify for funding un-
der the Adaptation Fund in order to address drought, desertification and watershed protection,
forest conservation, restoration of native forest ecosystems, restoration of salinized soils.
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emissions times five.141 These measures were meant to limit the over-
all amount of carbon reduction that could be claimed through the
CDM.142 These rules were largely reiterated at the 7th COP in 2001.143
V.  CONCLUSION
The inclusion of sinks within the climate regime has long been a
source of contention.  Despite earlier pleas not to include sinks in the
mechanisms until a multitude of uncertainties were resolved, the in-
ternational community allowed their entry into the Protocol.  The
largely unspecified nature of their inclusion, in addition to a large
number of uncertainties surrounding them, was a primary of the
United States’ walkout in 2001.  Following the U.S. walkout, the re-
maining members have attempted to resolve many of the difficulties
and omitted modalities that continue to plague the issue of carbon
sinks—from scientific uncertainties to linkages to deforestation.
Whether these attempts will be successful is a matter of speculation.
141. Conference of the Parties 6, supra note 103, at 11-12.
142. Id.
143. Conference of the Parties 7, supra note 66 at 60-61.
